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Executive Summary 
As the world’s largest multilateral donor, the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) is central to the evolution of development po-
licy and the international aid architecture. What IDA does, and how it 
does it, matters not only for partner countries, but also for other do-
nors, bilateral as well as multilateral. The Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA) and the Performance-based Allocation sys-
tem (PBA) together constitute the defining features of IDA. The CPIA 
rates countries’ performance on a total of 16 indicators against a stan-
dard for good policies and institutions. This performance rating is 
used to allocate funds so that, ceteris paribus, strong performers re-
ceive larger allocations than weak performers.  
 
The CPIA was originally focused on economic policy and manage-
ment to address fiduciary concerns, and served to allocate funds 
among IDA-eligible countries. While this remains its core function, 
the CPIA today is much broader in scope, defining a comprehensive 
standard for countries’ policies and institutions believed to facilitate 
economic growth, poverty reduction and the effective use of develop-
ment assistance. As a more ambitious and comprehensive standard for 
‘good’ policies, the CPIA has serves broader functions within IDA. 
The CPIA is now to i) serve as an anchor for the Bank’s Country As-
sistance Strategy (CAS), ii) be a central tool in the on-going policy 
dialogue with partner countries; and iii) signal to partner countries – 
through the PBA system – incentives for adopting policies and build-
ing institutions that conform to the standard defined by the CPIA. This 
study assesses these latter three functions of the CPIA in two countries 
– Ethiopia and Malawi.  
 
Overall, we find that the CPIA is not a significant part of the ongoing 
policy dialogue at the country level, that it does not significantly shape 
the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy, and, finally, that the CPIA – 
through the PBA – does not effectively signal incentives to partner 
countries to improve their ‘performance’ as defined by the CPIA. In 
both countries studied, the content, function and results of the CPIA 
are known but to very small group who interact directly with the 
Bank. When comparing the CPIA scores and the respective, country-
specific CASs, moreover, we find little evidence that the CPIA heav-
ily shape their contents and priorities. Lastly, there are no robust indi-
cations that the CPIA and the PBA provide effective signals or incen-
tives to governments to make decisions that conform to the standard 
Ole Jacob Sending and Jon Harald Sande Lie 8 
embedded in the CPIA. On this basis, we offer five general recom-
mendations:  
 
1. In order to be made into a diagnostic tool for shaping policies and 
institutions in partner countries, the process of producing the CPIA 
must be made more transparent, and the resultant CPIA ratings publi-
cized and actively promoted by the Bank – not only towards the gov-
ernment, but also to the general public.  
 
2. If the CPIA and the PBA are to signal incentives forcefully to re-
cipient countries, IDA allocations would have to be made publicly 
available for all to see that a government’s actions and policies actu-
ally result in either higher or lower allocations. Moreover, a link could 
easily be made between CPIA ratings and partner-country policies and 
priorities by including in the CPIA write-ups specific actions that 
would have to be taken by partner countries to improve the score over 
time.  
 
3. Clarify the role of the CPIA in shaping and informing the CAS rela-
tive to governments’ own PRSPs. The CAS is supposed to respond to 
the PRSP, but the CPIA is simultaneously said to shape the CAS. It 
unclear which is more important – the PRSP or the CPIA – in shaping 
the CAS. A review of established practice in different countries could 
be useful to clarify the how the CAS is, and should be, made. An im-
portant consideration here is whether the CPIA’s role in shaping the 
CAS undermines the principle of national ownership that underwrites 
the PRSP.  
 
4. The debate about performance vs need, and about the secrecy of 
CPIA ratings and write ups, should not be concluded before a more 
thorough assessment has been made to determine how well the CPIA 
captures the determinants of growth, poverty reduction and aid effec-
tiveness in various countries. If it does, there are good reasons to 
strengthen and expand the CPIA and the PBA. If not, other options 
would have to be considered. Such an assessment should be the basis 
for discussing the contents and appropriate role of the CPIA and the 
PBA.  
 
5. Donors, the Bank, and partner countries may want to consider that 
there is a structural tension between two roles that the CPIA and PBA 
are currently serving. One is an ‘allocation function’ that must be 
rules-based to ensure equitable treatment. The other is a ‘policy func-
tion’ that specifies a standard for good development policy and pro-
viding incentives for partner countries. The allocation function must 
be universal in character because of concerns of equitable treatment of 
partner countries, but the policy function need not be. Hence, there are 
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good reasons for trying to separate or de-couple the debate about the 
contents of the CPIA and PBA as an allocation mechanism from the 
debate about how the Bank should advise on policy and seek to help 
particular countries achieve growth, poverty reduction and effective 
uses of aid based on their individual circumstances. 

1 Introduction 
This study assesses the role of the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) at the country level. This is moti-
vated by the ongoing reflection on the contents and role of the CPIA 
in shaping the allocations of the International Development Associa-
tion (IDA) and in informing country-specific operations. The CPIA is 
an analytical tool defined and used by the Bank to assess borrowing 
countries’ policies and institutions, and it plays a key function in in-
forming the Performance Based Allocation (PBA) system, which de-
termines the distribution of IDA funds to eligible recipients. Three 
other functions of the CPIA are frequently mentioned, and it is these 
functions that are to be assessed here. These are, first, the role in shap-
ing and informing the country-level policy dialogue between the 
World Bank and partner countries; second, the signalling of incentives 
for improved performance through the PBA system; and three, the 
shaping and prioritizing of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Stra-
tegy (CAS). It is difficult to assess the relevance and utility of the 
CPIA in isolation from its primary function as a tool for allocating 
scarce IDA resources among countries. Thus, we also discuss the im-
plications of our findings and those of others for the broader debate 
about the proper contents and role of the CPIA in IDA and in World 
Bank operations more generally.  
1.1 Structure and scope 
In the first section we present an overview of the debate about CPIA 
over time, concerning its role in shaping IDA allocations and in in-
forming policy dialogue, in shaping the CAS, and in providing, 
through the PBA, incentives to client countries to change policies. 
Section two provides an analysis of the evolution, content and role of 
the CPIA and the PBA in IDA. It sets the stage for the detailed analy-
sis of the CPIA at the country level in the two case studies in the fol-
lowing section. Section three reports on findings from the two case 
studies. It first describes key characteristics of Ethiopia and Malawi, 
and then assesses the role of the CPIA in each. The discussion is or-
ganized under sub-headings concerning the several roles that the 
CPIA is expected to play (incentives, policy dialogue, and informing 
the CAS). We move on in section four to highlight some general find-
ings and conclude by offering some recommendations for how to 
move the debate about the content and role of the CPIA forward.  
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The report considers the CPIA at the country level. It does not attempt 
to assess the validity and reliability of the CPIA as such, nor analyse 
the content of the PBA. Other studies, such as the IEG’s evaluation of 
the CPIA, and the study commissioned by the GTZ on the CPIA and 
PBA, address those issues, whereas this study is specifically focused 
on the country-level uses and role of the CPIA and the PBA.1 Inas-
much as discussions of the CPIA and the PBA system need to take 
into account how the CPIA and the PBA are perceived and used (or 
not) at the country level, such an analysis of country-level dynamics 
seems warranted.  
 
1.2 Method  
The study is based on desk review of primary and secondary sources, 
quantitative data from the World Bank and OECD, and in-depth inter-
views with stakeholders in Ethiopia and in Malawi.2 Although this 
study is limited to two countries, we feel that our findings are not uni-
que and thus have relevance to the broader debate about the CPIA and 
the PBA. This is in part, as discussed below, because the basis for our 
findings concerns structural features of the CPIA and the PBA and 
their role in Bank operations in partner countries. That is: the literature 
on aid effectiveness that underwrites the CPIA and the PBA – key 
among which is the ‘conditional view’ that became central during the 
1990s, largely through research funded by or performed at the Bank – 
holds that aid is effective only in circumstances of settings with good 
policies and institutions. Further, it holds that aid itself is not particu-
larly effective in changing such policies and institutions. One of the 
key challenges for reforming or amending the CPIA and PBA is that 
they build on the first of these findings, while apparently ignoring the 
other concerning the effect of aid on policies and institutions.3  
 
                                                 
1  IEG (2009) ‘The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment: An Evalua-
tion’. June. Washington DC; Steets, Julia (2009) ‘Adaptation and Refinement of the 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’. Discussion paper commis-
sioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. GTZ and 
GPPI: Eschborn. 
2  Interviews were conducted with officials from the World Bank, African Development 
Bank, donor countries, officials from government ministries, especially the Ministry of 
Finance, Planning, and the Central Bank. Interviews were also conducted with representa-
tives of non-governmental organizations in both countries. Interviews were conducted in 
June (Ethiopia) and August (Malawi) 2009. 
3  For an overview, see IEG (2009) ‘The World Bank’s Policy and Institutional Assess-
ment’, pp. 30–31. 
2 CPIA -- Background and Role 
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is an impor-
tant diagnostic tool integral to the World Bank’s Performance-Based 
Allocation System (PBA), which determines the distribution of scarce 
IDA funding to eligible countries.4 The PBA includes both country 
needs and performance.5 ‘Needs’ are proxied by population size and 
GNI per capita,6 while performance is measured by the CPIA and the 
Bank’s loan portfolio performance. The distribution of IDA funds is 
thus not determined solely by the CPIA – but it remains predominant 
(see below).  
 
The CPIA was initiated by the Bank in the late 1970s, and consists of 
a set of criteria that represent the various policy and institutional di-
mensions the Bank deems important for effective poverty reduction 
and economic growth. It was not, however, until 2004 that the Bank 
disclosed the CPIA criteria and ratings of IDA countries. The CPIA 
consists of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted clusters. For 
each criterion, countries are rated on a scale from 1 (very weak per-
formance) to 6 (very strong performance), and a total rating is calcu-
lated for each country – the CPIA score.  
 
The CPIA is designed to measure a country’s overall governance envi-
ronment, policies and institutional arrangements. It covers only those 
aspects that are under a country’s control, and it is focused on actions, 
not plans and intentions. The CPIA exercise is undertaken by the 
Bank’s respective country teams in cooperation with the region’s Chi-
ef Economist and various thematic Networks. It is administered by the 
Bank’s Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) network. The 
assessed government may be and usually is consulted during the CPIA 
                                                 
4  The IDA, established in 1960, together with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) constitutes the World Bank. Currently there are 79 countries 
eligible for IDA funding. Eligibility is determined using two criteria: i) relative poverty 
defined as GNI per capita below an established threshold and updated annually (being 
USD1,135 for fiscal year 2010), and; ii) lack of creditworthiness to borrow on market 
terms and therefore a need for concessional resources to finance the country’s develop-
ment programme.  
5  The IDA has established a set of exceptions to the PBA formula: i) blend countries, mean-
ing countries that are eligible for IDA resources on the basis of per capita income but also 
have limited creditworthiness to borrow from IBRD, might receive less; ii) post-conflict 
countries can be provided with additional resources in periods of exceptional need; iii) 
countries re-engaging with the IDA can receive exceptional allocations for a shorter pe-
riod; iv) additional funds can be provided to IDA-eligible countries in the aftermath of 
major natural disaster; v) regional integration projects can provide participating countries 
with additional resources; vi) exceptional resources can be provided to aid the clearance 
of arrears to the IBRD or the IDA (World Bank 2008: 44–45).  
6  Allocations increase with higher population, and decrease with an increase in GNI per 
capita.  
Ole Jacob Sending and Jon Harald Sande Lie 14 
exercise, but the government does not hold any formal role within the 
CPIA process. The Bank shares with the government the so-called 
‘write-ups’ that underpin and justify the numerical score accorded to 
each of the criteria in the CPIA. While the score is shared and dis-
cussed with the government, it is not negotiated with them.  
2.1 Evolution of the role and content of the CPIA 
By itself, the CPIA is merely one among the World Bank’s many an-
nual assessments of partner countries. What renders it important is 
that it has always been tied to the IDA’s allocation practices. Since 
1977, the CPIA has been the key determinant of country performance 
ratings that the IDA uses in allocating funds to eligible countries 
through its performance-based allocation system. The precursor to the 
CPIA focused primarily on countries’ economic management and po-
verty alleviation efforts. For IDA 10,7 for example, donors were in-
formed that countries were rated on  
 
Short-term management includes consideration of monetary, fiscal, exchange 
rate, and pricing policies. For the long term, consideration is given to struc-
tural policies— including external and domestic trade regimes, private sector 
development, tax and financial sector policies, governance, and natural re-
source management. Poverty alleviation includes policies promoting the de-
livery of social services, and the reduction of biases against the agricultural 
terms of trade and the demand for labor.8 
 
Over time, both the scope and contents of the CPIA criteria have 
changed. In 1997, governance was explicitly introduced through a 
new criterion on legal and regulatory framework. Here, concern with 
corruption was central, as evidenced by the reference to the impor-
tance of paying attention ‘to the implications for corruption of public 
sector administration’ in assessing all elements—tax reforms, volume 
and composition of expenditures, public expenditure management, 
and civil administration’.9 The following year, the CPIA was again 
changed, in part as a response to Burnside and Dollar’s (1997) influ-
ential study ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’. With this, the governance as-
pects of the CPIA were further expanded and refined – now totalling 
six specific criteria. This marked a significant change in the CPIA, 
which now came to reflect ‘an agreed set of Bankwide criteria for 
promoting growth and poverty reduction.’10 In 1999, social policies 
were added at the urging of IDA deputies. Later, in 2001, the CPIA 
also came to cover policies and institutions for dealing with communi-
                                                 
7  Donors meet every three years to replenish IDA funds and review IDA’s policies. The 
number following IDA refers to specific, sequential triennial periods: IDA 10 refers to the 
July 1993–June 1996 period. The current IDA is number 15. IDA 15 runs from July 2008 
to June 2011.  
8  IDA (1992) ‘Allocations Revisited’, IDA10 Discussion Paper 2, Annex, page 20. 
9  OED (2001) ‘Review of the Performance Based Allocation System, IDA10–12’, p. 9. 
10  Ibid. p.11. 
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cable diseases. And in 2004, important changes were made concerning 
how the CPIA was performed, with detailed guidelines for how each 
criterion was to be assessed.  
 
These developments reflect important features of the evolution in gen-
eral development thinking, but they also reflect an important feature 
of IDA operations: From being focused on a set of core of economic 
issues linked with the concern as to the fiduciary risks of IDA grants 
and loans when the association was first established, the CPIA now 
covers a country’s policies and institutional characteristics on a com-
prehensive scale. It defines a standard of ‘good’ policies and institu-
tions that IDA sees as conducive to sustainable growth, poverty reduc-
tion and the effective use of development assistance.11 As such, the 
CPIA is not seen solely as a tool for allocating funds among countries 
on the basis of fiduciary concerns, it also defines a standard for the 
types of policies and institutions that the IDA encourages and ad-
vances through its general policies and country operations.  
2.2 CPIA: core function 
The CPIA’s core function is to provide the key input to the PBA sys-
tem. As an international organization, the World Bank is concerned to 
reduce or mitigate the politicization of allocation decisions. The CPIA 
and the PBA together fill this function, giving this rules-based alloca-
tion system a specific form, focusing on the content and quality of 
countries’ policies and institutions. While the IDA is based on the 
PBA system, the allocation mechanism also factors in country needs, 
measured by GNI per capita and population size. Moreover, an as-
sessment of the performance of Bank operations at the country level – 
the ARRP – is factored into the formula that yields the Country Per-
formance Rating (CPR). The CPR combines the four CPIA clusters 
(A–D). In keeping with prevailing development thinking in the Bank, 
the CPR accords much higher weight to the governance aspects of the 
CPIA (Cluster D). Currently, the CPR is calculated as follows:12 
 
Country Performance Rating = (0.24 * CPIA A-C + 0.68 * CPIA D + 
0.08 * Portfolio) 
 
It gives 68% weight to the governance factor, 24% to the other CPIA 
clusters, and 8% to the portfolio assessment (ARRP). To arrive at the 
final IDA allocation, the CPR is given a weighting of 5 and combined 
with population size and poverty levels, as measured by GNI per cap-
ita, as follows:  
                                                 
11  ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessments’, 2008 Assessment Questionnaire, OPCS, 
the World Bank, p.1. 
12  The formula is subject to triennial discussions, in the event of IDA replenishment.  
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IDA country allocation = f (Country performance rating 5.0, Popula-
tion1.0, GNI/capita-0.125) 
 
In addition, there are important exceptions to the PBA formula. These 
concern, inter alia, capping of the allocation to countries that are also 
eligible for loans from the IBRD, additional resources to post-conflict 
countries, additional resources for countries re-engaging with the IDA 
and countries that have experienced major natural disasters.13  
 
Until the mid-2000s, the CPIA ratings were not made public. That 
they are so today reflects at least two developments: An increased fo-
cus on transparency and accountability in development policy in gen-
eral and at the Bank in particular, but also an ambition on the part of 
Bank management and IDA deputies to broaden the role of the CPIA. 
As stated in various IDA documents from the last decade, the CPIA is 
no longer solely an exercise addressed to the task of determining the 
allocation of funds among countries. As discussed in greater detail be-
low, the expansion of the CPIA’s functions to cover all key factors 
held to promote growth and aid effectiveness lies at the heart of the 
on-going debates about whether and how to modify or change the 
CPIA and the PBA system.  
2.3 CPIA in Bank operations 
The primary objective of the CPIA is to provide the key input to the 
PBA system in order to determine the distribution of scarce IDA re-
sources among eligible countries. In addition to this function, the 
CPIA is also intended by the Bank to i) anchor the Bank’s strategies at 
the country level through the ‘Country Assistance Strategy’ (CAS), ii) 
inform and underwrite the on-going policy dialogue with partner 
countries, iii) signal incentives for partner countries to over time adopt 
policies that conform to the CPIA, and iv) establish a standard for the 
designation of ‘fragile states’. Here, we focus on the first three, as a 
discussion of whether and how the CPIA is appropriate for determin-
ing state fragility would require a separate analysis. 
 
As to the incentive function, the IDA noted in 2002 that changes in the 
PBA in 2001 were in two parts, one concerning assessment and one 
concerning allocations, specifying that ‘the PBA’s system’s changes 
and results in 2001’ are, in terms of assessments, that it provides ‘in-
centives for good governance across the full spectrum of performance 
by replacing the governance discount by the governance factor. This 
eliminated a discontinuity in the assessment process and resulted in 
                                                 
13  IDA (2008) ‘IDA’s Performance Based Allocation System for IDA 15’, p. 1.  
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greater dispersion in the performance ratings.’14 The same report no-
tes, concerning the ‘governance factor’ then introduced, that ‘a coun-
try that scores above the mid-point on the governance-related criteria 
will receive a premium, and a country that that scores below the mid-
point on governance will receive a discount.’15 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the structural linkages of CPIA with regard to the 
CAS and client countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – or 
PRSP – and how it anchors and relates to the overall policy dialogue 
between the Bank and client government. Whereas the boxes on the 
left side belong to government’s domestic realm, the boxes on the 
right relate to the Bank.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The chart explicates the structural relations among the various 
components integral to the IDA country allocations system 
 
The PRSP outlines government’s own national development and pov-
erty alleviation strategy, which needs the approval of the Bank’s board 
to become effective. The CAS is the Bank’s policy response to the 
PRSP, and explicates the government strategies and policies the Bank 
opts to support. As Figure 1 shows, there is a direct interrelationship 
between the assessment of country policies and institutions and the 
government’s own PRSP. The assessment of the country’s policies 
and institutions, i.e. CPIA, feeds into the Bank’s IDA allocation sys-
tem, which again provides the financial frameworks of CAS as well as 
informing on its content.  
                                                 
14  IDA (2002) ‘Linking IDA Support to Country Performance, Third Annual Report on 
IDA’s Country Assessment and Allocation Process’, April 2002. p 2. 
15  Ibid., p. 4. 
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It is noted in IDA documents, for example, that the CPIA shapes the 
CAS and policy dialogue by serving as a ‘diagnostic tool’ that ‘indi-
cate[s] areas where attention needs to be focused and thereby influ-
ence the focus of the IDA-supported program; for example, the CPIA 
influences the ESW work program which may have an impact on the 
PRSP and, in turn, IDA’s assistance program and future CPIA re-
sults.’16  
 
The governance factor (Cluster D) in the CPIA has been the subject of 
much discussion. It is now seen as the most important determinant of 
growth, poverty reduction of aid effectiveness, and is weighted, as no-
ted above, with 68% in the PBA. But the successive changes to the 
PBA and the role of the CPIA within it have incurred some costs, not 
least a loss of transparency and clarity in the incentives that the CPIA-
PBA ostensibly offers to partner countries. As a result, efforts have 
been made to make the system more transparent and understandable:  
 
Implementation of the PBA formula has ensured that more resources have 
been allocated and committed in better-governed countries. The review also 
finds that the inclusion of the governance factor has increased the responsi-
veness of country performance ratings (and therefore IDA allocations) to 
changes in governance. … Going forward, management proposes that the 
country performance rating formula be simplified and its outcomes be made 
less volatile. Simplification of the formula is necessary at a time when IDA is 
taking steps to be transparent about how its resources are allocated through 
public disclosure of its country performance assessments. A simpler formula 
would promote a clearer understanding among partner countries of which 
factors most influence IDA allocations. Moreover, a simplified formula 
would better reflect the gains made in improving measurements of gover-
nance. 17 
 
And again in 2008, IDA emphasized that it was important to simplify 
the governance factor because of concerns with signalling incentives: 
‘To make the system more effective at the country level by enhancing 
transparency of resource flows, Deputies agreed to simplify the for-
mula using a linear transformation.’18 As a review of the Bank’s Glo-
bal Environmental Facility (GEF) noted about the CPIA and PBA 
‘Transparency and clarity are, of course, extremely important to the 
rationale for using a performance-based formula at all. The easier the 
formula is to understand, the more clearly can its incentive aspects be 
communicated to the eligible countries.’19 
 
                                                 
16  IDA 2002 ‘Summary of the PBA system’, p. 6.  
17  IDA 14 (2006) ‘IDA’s Performance Based Allocation System: A Review of the Govern-
ance Factor’. World Bank. Para 4.  
18  IDA 15 (2008) ‘Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development 
Association To the Board of Governors’, p. 21.  
19  Watson, Kenneth (2008) ‘Mid-Term Review of the GEF Resource Allocation Framework 
– Comparison of the GEF RAF with other Performance-Based Allocation Systems’, 
Technical Paper #8 GEF Evaluations Office. pp. 6–7. 
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Although not the sole determinant for allocating IDA funds, the CPIA 
is by far the most important one. It is also the only factor on which a 
client government might have any immediate impact by altering its 
policies. This, moreover, is illustrative of a wider change on the part 
of the Bank and the policies it pursues, representing a generational 
shift from economic conditionality integral to the structural adjust-
ment programmes of the early 1980s to political conditionality. This 
has often been referred to as a shift from first- to second-generation 
conditionality, where the latter essentially promotes the introduction 
and strengthening of the institutions of liberal democracy – as con-
tained in the CPIA cluster D. Central to the debate on the role of CPIA 
and PBA is the extent to which the CPIA is reliable and valid for cap-
turing the determinants of growth, poverty reduction, and aid effec-
tiveness and thus whether the Bank should continue using it as a com-
prehensive standard for ‘good’ policy.20 In focusing on two countries 
below, we do not aim to assess the reliability and validity directly. We 
merely ask how the CPIA and PBA function at the country level. 
 
                                                 
20  See e.g. Jeff Powell: ‘The World Bank Policy Scorecard. The New Conditionality?’ Bret-
ton Woods Project, 22 November 2004. Available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B126%5D=x-126-84455  
3 Case Studies 
3.1. Ethiopia Case Study 
Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country, with an estimated 
population at around 80 million.21 It is also among the world’s poorest 
countries, with an average per capita income at USD 220. It is ranked 
38 (out of 75) on the 2008 IDA CPIA index,22 and 169 out of 179 on 
the UN Human Development Index.23 It is the largest country in the 
Horn of Africa, a region destabilized by numerous intra- and interstate 
conflicts over recent decades. Plagued by famines and droughts, 
Ethiopia has embarked on extensive efforts to improve food security. 
In May 2005 the country held general elections, which were initially 
deemed free and fair by international observers. Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment employed draconian measures to police the post-election 
turmoil that erupted, and opposition candidates and journalists were 
imprisoned with charges of treason and inciting to violence after hav-
ing taken to the streets with allegations of electoral fraud and corrup-
tion.  
 
In response to what were seen as deteriorating developments for de-
mocracy and good governance, the World Bank and bilateral donors 
discontinued their direct budget support. Rather than cutting or with-
holding funds, the Bank and bilaterals reallocated funds to a newly 
established Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme. PBS is a 
large programme involving the government and eight development 
partners with a total project cost for the first phase (2006–2009) of 
USD 2562 million. The Bank is the largest donor, with an annual 
commitment of USD 215 million. Although the Bank discontinued 
budget support over governance-related issues, the government main-
tained its service delivery due to the PBS. Government and donors 
have pledged commitment to a new PBS2, which reportedly includes 
an enhanced focus on governance issues and capacity building of de-
mocratic institutions.24  
 
In January 2009, the Ethiopian parliament adopted a new law regulat-
ing civil society organizations (CSOs). The law, if enacted, puts re-
                                                 
21  The World Bank puts the population at 72.7 million in 2006, and the UN at 83.1 million 
in 2007. See  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Resources/ET_Glance.pdf and 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crname=Ethiopia respectively.  
22 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/I AI2008 
table2.pdf  
23  See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/  
24  Interviews with officials at the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
(MoFED), 9 June 2009.  
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strictions on the human rights activities of domestic and external 
CSOs by restricting such efforts undertaken by organizations that re-
ceive more than ten per cent of their funding from abroad. The law has 
received considerable criticism from international observers, who fear 
it will be applied randomly and used to control civil society and oppo-
sition in the upcoming 2010 elections. This remains to be seen, how-
ever.25 The government asserts that the law aims to secure Ethiopian 
interests, lessen the influence of external actors, and uphold Ethiopian 
sovereignty over domestic political life.  
  
PASDEP – Ethiopia’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) – states that poverty eradication is the main development ob-
jective of the government.26 Despite challenges in domestic policies 
and critical governance concerns, Ethiopia has seen significant pro-
gress on key human development indicators – notably primary school 
enrolment, child mortality, access to clean water, and levels of pov-
erty.27 In recent years Ethiopia has been one of the fastest growing 
non-oil economies in Africa, with double-digit growth rates for six 
consecutive years. Partly as a result, the World Bank has referred fa-
vourably to Ethiopia’s emerging ‘dual take-off’: ‘Ethiopia shows 
some signs of having entered a new phase of more rapid economic 
growth, while simultaneously experiencing what might be called a 
“service delivery take-off’”.28 The Bank expects Ethiopia to ‘leave the 
ranks of the poorest countries in the world sooner than might have 
been expected only a short time ago’29 if this the dual take-off can be 
sustained.  
Key Findings  
Incentives and Allocations in Ethiopia  
While Ethiopia is seen as a poor performer on governance issues, the 
Bank deems Ethiopia to be doing well in economic growth and service 
delivery. Development partners agree that Ethiopia’s good achieve-
ments are due to its having one of the most ‘pro-poor budgets’ in Af-
rica.30  
 
                                                 
25  See e.g. Amnesty International: ‘Ethiopian Parliament adopts repressive new NGO law’ 
(8 January 2009 – available at www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/ethiopian-
parliament-adopts-repressive-new-ngo-law-20090108); Daily Monitor: ‘U.S. expresses 
concern on Ethiopia CSO law’ (23 October 2008 – available at 
www.allafrica.com/stories/200810230780.html).  
26  The Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) was 
approved by parliament in May 2006, and covers fiscal years 2005/06 to 2009/10. Avail-
able at http://go.worldbank.org/DBKOAPDD51 
27  See World Bank’s Country brief on Ethiopia; http://go.worldbank.org/WA1RL12OL0.  
28  World Bank, 2008: ‘Country Assistance Strategy for Ethiopia’, 2 April 2008. p. i. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Interviews in Addis Ababa with officials and representatives of the Norwegian embassy 
(8 June 2009); UNDP (9 June 2009); DFID (10 June 2009); GTZ (11 June 2009); and 
Swedish embassy (11 June 2009).  
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Table 1: Ethiopia CPIA Scores 2005–200831     
      
Cluster Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008
A: Economic Management 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.3 
  1. Macroeconomic management 3.5 3 3 2.5 
  2. Fiscal policy 4 4 4 4 
  3. Debt policy 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
B: Structural Policies 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
  4. Trade 3 3 3 3 
  5. Financial sector 3 3 3 3 
  6. Business regulatory environment 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
C: Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.6 
  7. Gender equality 3 3 3 3 
  8. Equity of public resources use 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
  9. Building human resources 3.5 3.5 4 4 
  10. Social protection and labour 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  
11. Policies and institutions for environmental 
sustainability 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 
D: Public Sector Management 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 
  12. Property rights and rule based governance 2.5 3 3 3 
  
13. Quality of budgetary and financial man-
agement 3.5 4 4 4 
  14. Efficiency of revenue mobilization 4 4 4 4 
  15. Quality of public administration 3 3 3 3 
  
16. Transparency, accountability and corrup-
tion in public sector 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 
 
Ethiopia’s average CPIA score has been 3.4 over the last four years.32 
Although it has remained fairly stable and consistent, Ethiopia is ran-
ked 38 out of 75 IDA-eligible countries, and just above the 3.2 thresh-
old for being classified as fragile.33 Despite a stable CPIA, IDA loans 
have increased in size over the same period, from USD 449.9 million 
in 2005, to 504.7 million in 2006, 630 million in 2007, and USD 634.5 
in 2008.34  
 
The CPIA scores and aid allocations do not correlate. While it is diffi-
cult to assess how much IDA allocations would change as an effect of 
changes in CPIA scores over time, ceteris paribus, we can note that a 
stable, average CPIA of 3.4 from 2005 to 2008 has co-existed with an 
increase in IDA funding from USD 449.9 million to 634.5 million 
over the same period. Moreover, the termination of direct budget sup-
                                                 
31  The CPIA scores are available at http://go.worldbank.org/S2THWI1X60   
32  While the rounded averages for 2005 and 2006 are 3 and 4, respectively, the actual aver-
age for 2007 is 3.425 and 3.35 for 2008.  
33  The Bank’s definition of fragile states covers low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below 
on the CPIA. Previously both Cluster D and CPIA had to be 3.2 or less for a country to be 
designated as fragile.  
34  These figures derive from the respective and relevant CASs. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/ZBCG9IF761  
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port – with reference to the government’s handling of the post-2005 
election turmoil – and the establishment of the PBS as a substitute did 
not entail any cut in the Bank’s overall allocations. Rather, two out of 
five criteria in the public sector management cluster, the governance 
cluster, received an increase of 0.5 each from 2005 to 2006. That the 
CPIA average remains 3.4 is due to the 0.5 drop in economic man-
agement. The rationale for increasing the score on two good govern-
ance-related criteria remains uncertain, in view of the post-election 
turmoil and donors’ termination of direct budget support.35 It seems 
puzzling that concerns over governance issues, critical enough to lead 
the Bank to alter its partnership and funding modality significantly, 
are not reflected in the CPIA scores.36  
 
Since 2005 there has been a significant decrease in the score on mac-
roeconomic management, from 3.5 in 2005 to 2.5 in 2008. This 
change in assessment by the Bank has taken place in the same period 
as Ethiopia has seen high economic growth rates for six consecutive 
years. This growth is challenged by high domestic inflation and a dif-
ficult balance-of-payment situation, with weak foreign exchange re-
serves driving fuel and food prices up. Although these remain critical 
macroeconomic challenges, it is also recognized that these problems 
are exacerbated by the steep rise in global food and commodity prices, 
the international financial crisis, and the lack of rain during the first 
half of 2008.  
 
While influencing the domestic economy, these are all exogenous fac-
tors outside the control of the government and thus they are not part of 
what the CPIA assesses. The government has removed fuel-price sub-
sidies, and the National Bank has raised the minimum reserve re-
quirement on commercial bank deposits. These measures have 
brought the high domestic inflation under temporary control. Never-
theless, the Bank asserts that the county’s macroeconomic situation 
remains tenuous,37 and the decrease in CPIA score on economic man-
agement is made with reference to what the Bank deems an incom-
plete sequencing and implementation of what it generally considered a 
sound policy response by the government. Here it is important to note 
that all interviewees agreed that these measures had been undertaken 
on the government’s initiative to improve the macroeconomic situa-
tion, and not as an attempt to improve the CPIA rating as such. Both 
government and donor representatives agreed that the government 
would never alter its policies just for the sake of accommodating do-
                                                 
35  Steets (2009: 71) remarks that the improvement in criteria 12 and 13 of the CPIA is a 
reflection of international praise for Ethiopia’s market reforms and good governance.  
36  Reflection made by DFID programme officer (10 June 2009).  
37  Interview with senior official at World Bank country office in Addis Ababa (11 June 
2009).  
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nors or to increase its CPIA to gain more IDA funding.38 Indeed, in-
terviewees held that the government would rather opt to lose devel-
opment assistance than accommodate donor demands and policy pre-
scriptions. 
 
Policy Dialogue 
The macroeconomic situation was one of two key themes at the Ninth 
Government–Donor High Level Forum (HLF) of 20 April 2009, in 
which government ministers (notably the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development) meet donor representatives (the DAG 
chairs39 and senior IFI representatives). The themes were the new 
CSO law and the macroeconomic situation, both central to issues cov-
ered by the CPIA. The CSO law, which had already been adopted, 
was subject to discussion only on technical issues, implementation and 
application. The session on macroeconomic issues was initiated by a 
joint presentation made by the IMF and World Bank representatives. 
The IMF representative focused on topics falling under CPIA’s Eco-
nomic Management cluster, and the Bank representative attended to 
issues dealing with structural policies, integral to cluster B of the 
CPIA.  
 
There was little debate over the IMF representative’s presentation of 
the macroeconomic challenges, as the government had already em-
barked on several policy measures (see above).40 The Bank represen-
tative addressed structural issues, i.e. those falling under CPIA cluster 
B, as part and parcel of stabilizing the economy, thus making a call for 
modernizing the financial sector to facilitate private-sector activities. 
That would entail opening up and privatizing such key institutions as 
the banking system and the telecommunication sector, and would open 
up for private ownership of land. Reportedly, the government, in its 
response, ‘could agree with 90–95% of what is suggested… In effect, 
20 of the 25 recommendation … are agreeable but the others require 
further discussion.’41 Most of what the government did commit to re-
lates to the macroeconomic situation, to which government had al-
ready adopted policy measures. The government said it would adjust 
macroeconomic management issues and welcomed IMF assistance in 
tightening up inflation problems.42 However, the government did not 
                                                 
38  This view is reflected by nearly all interviewees, e.g. senior official at MoFED’s Multilat-
eral Cooperation Department (12 June 2009); World Bank senior officials (10 June 2009); 
a political affairs officer at the British Embassy (11 June 2009); UNDP representative (10 
June 2009).  
39  DAG, the Development Assistance Group Ethiopia, is a mechanism for coordination 
among bi- and multilateral donors. 
40  Interview with UNDP official (9 June 2009). See also minutes from Ninth Government–
Donor High Level Forum (HLF), 20 April 2009. Ministry of Finance and Economic De-
velopment. 
41  Quote from minutes of Ninth Government–Donor High Level Forum, 20 April 2009. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.  
42  See minutes from HLF meeting. 
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agree when it came to the Bank’s proposal to liberalize the financial 
sector, open the banking system to foreign investment, privatize tele-
communications and privatize land ownership. As in Malawi (see be-
low), the government was willing to discuss macroeconomic man-
agement, which it itself considers relevant, but not governance issues 
relating to privatization etc., which it deems to be ideological and po-
litical.43  
 
Although it is not possible to establish any direct correlation, the HLF 
meeting illustrates that the CPIA does influence country dialogue be-
tween the Bank and government. It is far from clear, however, 
whether the policy preferences and priorities embedded in the CPIA 
shape government priorities. Although government representatives 
recognize the necessity of CPIA as an instrument for determining the 
distribution of scarce IDA funding, they contest the contents of the 
CPIA for reasons of ideology, alleged subjectivity and lack of trans-
parency.44 The CPIA is seen as an ideological policy package promul-
gated by the Bank.45 As the debate over structural policies illustrates, 
the government sees these as explicitly challenging its ideological ori-
entation.46 For example, Ethiopia’s ‘pro-poor budget’ is, amongst oth-
ers, based on revenues derived in part from the government’s owner-
ship of telecommunications, land, and the banking system – sectors 
the Bank would like to see privatized. Consequently, the CPIA is 
criticized for rewarding policies seen as neither appropriate nor desir-
able by the Ethiopian government. The contestation over ideology re-
lates to the criticism of over the CPIA’s focus on performance, i.e. 
policy input. The Ethiopian government has been delivering good re-
sults according to the Bank’s own standards for economic growth and 
poverty alleviation, and feels it unfair to be penalized because it pur-
sues policies advanced by the Bank. This underscores the criticism of 
the CPIA as being ideological and insensitive to country context. 
Ethiopia’s economic growth and poverty alleviation are, moreover, 
seen as falsifying the CPIA’s underlying assumption that one certain 
set of policies is more conducive to growth and poverty reduction than 
others.  
 
Interviewees acknowledge the Bank has taken a major step by disclos-
ing the CPIA ratings, but the process through which they are produced 
is seen by those familiar with it as non-transparent and subjective. 
Quite a few of those interviewed were critical of how the Bank se-
lected and interpreted data to arrive at specific scores. In short, gov-
ernment officials with knowledge of the CPIA were not convinced 
                                                 
43  Interview, MoFED officials (9 June 2009).  
44  Interviews, MoFED (9 and 12 June 2009). 
45  Interview with DFID programme officer (10 June 2009).  
46  Interviews at MoFED (12 June 2009). This sentiment is also acknowledged by Bank rep-
resentatives (interviews at the Bank’s country office, 10 June 2009). 
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that the ‘subjective’ results used by Bank staff could be reliably trans-
ferred into ‘objective’ numerical scores.47 The government has no 
formal leeway to monitor, dispute or inform this process. This was 
also seen as undermining predictability and the potential incentive 
mechanism of the CPIA–PBA system.  
  
Anchoring CAS 
In official Bank documents, the CPIA is described as informing or 
‘anchoring’ the Bank’s lending programme at the country level, as 
outlined in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The CAS is the 
Bank’s response to a government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), setting out the total IDA allocation and which areas and pro-
jects will receive support. It is difficult to assert any direct linkages 
between CPIA and CAS in terms of policy influence for several fac-
tors, notably relating to sequencing.48 As the CPIA was disclosed only 
from 2005 it is hard to trace its influence on the Ethiopian CAS for the 
years 2003 to 2005. The interim CAS of 2006 to 2007 for Ethiopia 
saw enhanced attention to good governance, which seems warranted 
in light of the turmoil following the 2005 elections and the Bank’s 
termination of budget support. That is, however, not reflected in the 
CPIA score, as the governance cluster increased from 2005 to 2006. 
Moreover, the PASDEP runs from 2005 to 2009/10, underpinned by 
the Interim CAS of 2006–07 and the current CAS (2008–2011). How-
ever, it is evident that the Bank has stepped up its focus on economic 
management and structural policies in the country dialogue and in the 
recent CAS, even though this is not reflected in the PASDEP which is 
the government’s strategy.49  
 
With a score of 3.2, the cluster on structural policies in the CPIA is the 
one that has received the lowest average CPIA score in Ethiopia. The 
current CAS reads ‘In certain areas, such as reforms in the banking 
and telecommunications sectors and the encouragement of more pri-
vate sector investments in infrastructure, there are some differences of 
views between the government and the Bank on the approach. The 
Bank will continue a dialogue with government to seek to narrow the 
gap between these differing views’ (paragraph viii). Although Ethio-
pia is hailed for its economic progress, which the Bank attributes to, 
inter alia, ‘improvements in structural policies’ (CAS paragraph 11), 
Ethiopia will have to deal with some ‘structural issues’, because ‘turn-
ing such serendipitous beginnings into a virtuous circle of sorts re-
quires a set of sound policies’ (CAS paragraph 29). Attending to re-
forms of structural policies is, however, difficult for the Bank in the 
                                                 
47  Ibid.  
48  Although this statement draws largely on reading CPIA and CAS, it was also reflected by 
interviewees at the Bank’s country office (10 June 2009).  
49  The various Ethiopian CAS are available at http://go.worldbank.org/ZBCG9IF761 
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present context, as it has lost its unique advantage in country dialogue 
after terminating budget support and thus losing the opportunity of 
PRSC negotiations. With reference to a recent CAS Completion Re-
port, the current CAS asserts that ‘Budget support provided an impor-
tant forum for dialogue, especially on issues related to growth and 
structural reforms’ (paragraph 51), arguing for the resumption of 
budget support once donors and government agree that the conditions 
are appropriate. Budget support is desirable for the Bank, as that 
would provide ‘important opportunities to engage in policy dialogue 
on wide-ranging structural issues’ to address ‘key structural issues that 
hinder more robust growth of the private sector’ (CAS paragraph 60). 
As such, the Bank seems convinced – at least in the context of Ethio-
pia – that direct budget support and annual PRSC negotiations, rather 
than CPIA, would be more influential in terms of providing incentive 
mechanisms, shaping policy dialogue, anchoring CAS and infusing 
reforms of the policies contained in the CPIA.  
3.2. Case study: Malawi 
Political Context 
Malawi became independent in 1964. It was ruled as a one-party state 
by President Banda until 1994, when the first multi-party election was 
held. In 2004 and again in 2009, Bingu va Mutharika of the Democ-
ratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president. According to 
most observers, Mutharika and his DPP won by a sizeable margin 
largely because of their development agenda, where government in-
volvement in the agricultural sector was a central component. As with 
many multi-party democracies in Africa, political power tends to be 
concentrated in the executive. The power vested in the presidency by 
the constitution is combined with the informal power of patronage. As 
a result, personal loyalty and patronage to the president tend to over-
ride the formal checks and balances put in place by the constitution.  
 
Business and political elite are intertwined, with key members of both 
the ruling party and the opposition party having substantial business 
interests in tobacco, fertilizer, construction etc. One study notes that 
debates about economic policies between the opposition and govern-
ment are hampered by this feature, and that taxation ‘is often used to 
sanction business people who are not favoured by political elites’, a 
fact also attributed to the weakness of business associations.50 There 
are few civil society organizations focused on economic governance, 
with the exception of the Malawi Economic Justice Network and the 
Economics Association of Malawi.  
                                                 
50  Rakner, Lise et al. (2004) ‘The Political Economy of the Budget in Malawi: The Budget 
as a Theatre – the formal and informal institutional makings of the budget process in Ma-
lawi.’ p. 8 Available at http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC51.pdf  
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Economy 
Malawi is one of Africa’s most densely populated and poorest coun-
tries. The population is at 13.1 million, with 85% living in rural areas. 
Its GDP per capita (in PPP terms) is USD 800, placing it as one of the 
world’s poorest countries. On the latest Human Development Index, 
Malawi ranks 160 out of 182.51 Agriculture is the mainstay of the eco-
nomy, responsible for over one third of GDP and over 80% of export 
earnings. Agriculture is also the major source of subsistence, suppor-
ting 85% of the population. The government has given priority to ag-
riculture in its development strategy – allocating to it, according to 
one estimate, around 14% of the budget.52At present, donors contribu-
te around 40% per cent to Malawi’s annual budget.  
 
Recently, the country has seen substantial economic growth, avera-
ging 7.5% over the past four years. Inflation is down to single digits as 
of 2005, and was reported at 8.7% in May of 2009. Interest rates are 
also down, from around 40% in 2003 to the current 15%. This recent 
period of economic growth was preceded by a period of economic 
mismanagement where the IMF defined Malawi as being ‘off-track’, 
causing both the IMF and other donors to either suspend or drastically 
reduce their development assistance. Partly as a consequence of this 
reduction in development assistance, Malawi borrowed heavily in the 
private market, accumulating high levels of debt. In 2005, it comp-
leted the IMF ‘staff monitored program’ and reached the completion 
point of the HIPC initiative in 2006, resulting in debt relief amounting 
to over USD 2 billion.53  
 
Now on-track with the IMF, Malawi receives budget support totalling 
around USD 158 million. The Common Approach to Budget Support 
(CABS) group is the key institutional forum for policy dialogue bet-
ween donors and the government of Malawi. The CABS group em-
ploys a ‘Performance Assessment Framework’ (PAF) for its budget 
support which consists of detailed indicators and targets that are 
drawn from a variety of different sources. These targets are used as 
benchmarks against which government performance is measured. The 
Malawi government has in place an economic programme for 2006–
2011 – the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), 
which is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The World 
Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), is a response the MDGS. 
The MDGS emphasizes agriculture and food security, irrigation, in-
                                                 
51  Human Development Report 2009. Available at  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics. Accessed 5 January 2010. 
52  African Economic Outlook. Recent Economic Developments: 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-
africa/malawi/#/recent_economic_developments  
53  http://lilongwe.usembassy.gov/economic_commercial_section2.html 
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frastructure, energy generation, rural development, prevention and 
management of nutrition, and HIV/AIDS.54 
Key findings  
The key findings from the Malawi case study, substantiated below, 
can be summarized as follows: While the CPIA clearly does shape 
IDA allocations in how it enters the PBA formula that IDA uses to 
allocate funds, the changes in IDA funds available to Malawi have 
varied much more than CPIA ratings. This indicates that there is no 
direct economic incentive effect in the CPIA-PBA for partner coun-
tries to adopt policies that conform to the CPIA. As discussed below, 
this is further supported by the finding on the other role that the CPIA 
is expected to perform, namely to inform policy dialogue and shape 
the focus and priorities in the Bank’s CAS. Here, we find that the 
CPIA plays little or no role, as evidenced by the fact, first, that the 
CPIA is unknown to all but a very limited group of people in the go-
vernment, and second, that other indicators and assessment tools do-
minate the work of the CABS group. Finally, there is – as discussed in 
greater detail in the conclusion – a structural deficiency with regard to 
how the CPIA is to ‘anchor’ the CAS. According to Bank policy, the 
CAS is to respond to a government’s PRSP, in this case the MDGS. 
The CPIA is here said to enter the picture by specifying where there is 
the greatest need for improvement, thus serving, in theory, as an indi-
cation of where IDA funds are most needed to improve policies and 
institutional quality. But the CPIA does not seem to fill such a func-
tion, as the CPIA figures only marginally in the CAS to describe ap-
proximate funding levels, and is nowhere to be seen in the govern-
ment’s MDGS. Hence, and in contrast to official IDA assertions, the 
CPIA does not seem to ‘anchor’ the CAS. The CPIA does play a mar-
ginal role in the on-going policy dialogue, but it is not in any way an 
institutionalized framework or tool used in this dialogue.  
 
CPIA and incentives:  
CPIA ratings for Malawi have remained quite stable over time. As 
shown in Table 2 below, building human resources went down from 
3.5 in 2005 and 2006 to 3 in 2007 and 2008, but the most significant 
changes is on CPIA cluster A, Economic Management. Here, fiscal 
policy improved from 3 to 3.5 between 2006 and 2007; macroecono-
mic management also improved from 3 to 3.5 from 2005 to 2006. In 
the most heavily weighted cluster on governance, there are no 
changes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
54  Malawi Growth and Development Strategy – from Poverty to Prosperity 2006–2011.  
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Table 2: Malawi CPIA Scores 2005–2008 
      
Cluster Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A: Economic Management 3 3.2 3.3 3.3 
  1. Macroeconomic management 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  2. Fiscal policy 3 3 3.5 3.5 
  3. Debt policy 3 3 3 3 
B: Structural Policies 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  4. Trade 4 4 4 4 
  5. Financial sector 3 3 3 3 
  6. Business regulatory environment 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
C: Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 
  7. Gender equality 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  8. Equity of public resources use 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  9. Building human resources 3.5 3.5 3 3 
  10. Social protection and labour 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  
11. Policies and institutions for environ-
mental sustainability 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
D: Public Sector Management 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
  
12. Property rights and rule based govern-
ance 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  
13. Quality of budgetary and financial man-
agement 3 3 3 3 
  14. Efficiency of revenue mobilization 4 4 4 4 
  15. Quality of public administration 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
  
16. Transparency, accountability and corrup-
tion in public sector 3 3 3 3 
 
IDA allocations, however, have changed quite significantly in the 
same period. As indicated in Table 3 below, when compared to CPIA 
ratings in the same period, there is no clear relationship between the 
two. Of course, there can be no denying that the CPIA, through its role 
in the PBA system employed by IDA, plays a role in these allocations. 
Ceteris paribus, Malawi would receive a higher allocation with an 
improvement in CPIA ratings, especially on Cluster D. The point here 
is simply that other factors – factors that fall outside the PBA – over-
ride possible changes in the IDA allocation stemming from improve-
ments or deterioration in CPIA scores.  
 
Table 3: IDA allocations (plan and actual) as found in CAS for Malawi 2003–
201055 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Planned 95 75 70 70 80 80 90 90 
Actual  133.7 116.0 47.2 110.0     
                                                 
55  Country Assistance Strategy for Malawi 2003 and 2007. See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/MALAWI
EXTN/0,,menuPK:355885~pagePK:141132~piPK:141105~theSitePK:355870,00.html. 
Accessed October 1, 2009. 
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The impression left by the absence of a clear link between policies and 
IDA allocations is further substantiated by the fact that IDA alloca-
tions are not, as is claimed, solely rules-based. Other studies have do-
cumented that IDA allocations may change significantly from year to 
year, under political pressure from key donors in the Bank. Andersen 
et al. note, for example, how the IDA decided to withdraw lending to 
Allende’s Chile in 1970–1973; and during the Iran–Iraqi war, the IDA 
stopped funding to both countries. Moreover, World Bank assistance 
to Pakistan tripled from USD 226 million in 2001 to 860 million in 
2002.56 As such, IDA allocation decisions seem to be driven, or sha-
ped, also by a host of factors other than those contained in the CPIA 
and the PBA formula. Some of these have to do with the exceptions 
stipulated during IDA negotiations; others concern front- and back-
loading and flexibility in Bank operations to deviate from the alloca-
tion depending on country context, Bank plans, etc. One informant 
within the Bank estimated that Bank flexibility to deviate from the 
allocation at about 20 per cent, further reducing the visibility of the 
performance component of IDA allocations.57  
 
The CPIA, through the PBA, would have signalled incentives more 
clearly by increasing the performance element in the PBA, by reduc-
ing discretion in deciding on actual commitments and disbursements, 
by linking CPIA more clearly to allocations, or by specifying actions 
needed for better performance and thus more funds. Still, it remains an 
open question whether such incentive mechanisms would be strong 
enough to trump domestic political factors. Granted, there can be ob-
jectively effective incentives without the actors involved recognizing 
them – as when bus commuters answer in the negative when surveyed 
as to whether they will change behaviour if fares are raised, but where 
the sum-total of individual behaviour does result in a reduction of 
commuters.58  
The extent to which such incentives are effective in shaping govern-
ment policy and transforming institutions is a question beyond the 
scope of this report. Nevertheless, both primary and secondary sources 
indicate that even if there should be a strong link between perform-
ance and allocations, this is unlikely to contribute to Malawi changing 
its policies or institutions in a certain direction. Insights from the 
broader literature on aid and on the political economy in developing 
countries (and elsewhere) strongly suggest that domestic economic 
concerns, political alliances and personal loyalty will overrule the in-
                                                 
56  Andersen, Thomas B, Henrik Hansen and Thomas Markussen (2006) ‘US Politics and 
World Bank IDA Lending’, Discussion Papers 05–06. University of Copenhagen. p. 3 
57  Communication with Bank official, August 2009. 
58  We thank Kenneth Watson for challenging us to discuss the distinction between individ-
ual subjective perceptions and collective effects of incentives.  
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centive effects of the CPIA-PBA.59 A study of the budget process in 
Malawi concluded that it was a ‘theatre’: 
 
From the process of planning and formulation the budget, through its imple-
mentation and oversight, the study finds that the budget process in Malawi 
provides no realistic estimate of revenue or spending: The budget process is a 
theatre that masks the real distribution and spending. All the actors, from 
civil society, government, and donors seem aware that many of their state-
ments and actions have little bearing on actual distribution of resources. Yet, 
all stakeholders ‘act’ as if the budget planning and formulation will actually 
have a bearing on the actual implementation and distribution of resources. 
(Rakner et al. 2004: iv) 
 
This is not to suggest that donors have no influence. They do. As dis-
cussed below, the IMF is seen, as one informant put it, as the ‘ultimate 
whip’ as far as economic management is concerned. This is in part 
related to the fact that Malawians recall the consequences of being 
judged off-track by the IMF, causing other donors to cut their support 
drastically. But it also has something to do with the standing of the 
IMF towards partner countries, as the effects of IMF criticism or as-
sessments may prove very significant. This is not the case with the 
World Bank, as it only adjusts its lending and operations scenario 
when it wants to signal to the government that it some policies are ill-
founded. A case in point is how the Bank reduced its support from 40 
USD million to 30 million in response to the Malawi government’s 
agricultural subsidies programme, which the Bank opposed in part on 
the grounds that it excluded private actors. As a donor representative 
put it, ‘When the Bank is not happy about something, it signals this by 
reducing its support somewhat, but it allows the other donors to con-
tinue their support. It’s a bad cop, good cop thing.’60  
 
It should also be noted that, at least in Malawi, IDA loans must be ap-
proved by the parliament. This potentially complicates or ‘distorts’ the 
idea that the incentives at work through the PBA are effective in sig-
nalling the ‘price’ of a change in behaviour. Since the parliament is a 
political body made up of various groups vying for advantage, 
changes in IDA allocations that follow from the CPIA exercise do not 
automatically go into the government’s budgets. Loans must be ap-
proved, and thus the issue of both the size of the loan and the condi-
tions attached to it comes into play. 
 
CPIA and Country Dialogue  
The CPIA is not well known in government circles in Malawi. In the 
Ministry of Finance, it is familiar to those whose job it is to coordinate 
                                                 
59  See, for example, Hyden, Goran (2006) African Politics in Comparative Perspective. 
Cambridge University Press; Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl (2005) ‘Politics of Survival in the 
Making of Strong and Weak States’, Forum for Development Studies, no 2. 
60  Interview, Lilongwe, 26 August 2009. 
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donor issues. Interviews with officials elsewhere in the Ministry of 
Finance and in the Ministry of Planning indicate that the CPIA is not 
part of the framework within which government policy is formulated 
and administered. Here we should recall that the first time the Bank 
presented and discussed the role and content of the CPIA with donors 
was as late as the 1990s, as a workshop in London in 1996. The sec-
tion responsible within the Finance Ministry (Debt and Aid) in Ma-
lawi has tried to broaden the understanding and implications of the 
CPIA and the PBA across ministries, noting that ‘There is no room for 
complacency’, as the CPIA ratings affect aid allocations from the 
IDA. Nevertheless, only those who deal directly with Bank officials, 
who coordinate with the CABS group and who are consulted by the 
Bank during the production of the CPIA seem to be aware of what it is 
and why it matters. Similarly, officials at the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
noted that while they knew of the CPIA, that it assessed macroeco-
nomic issues under the purview of the Reserve Bank, they did not pay 
much attention to it, focusing instead on the dialogue with the IMF.  
 
Because Malawi receives budget support, the central arena for policy 
dialogue are the consultations between the government and the CABS 
group. The latter has established a Performance Assessment Frame-
work (PAF) with detailed targets, actions, and indicators of progress – 
but the CPIA is nowhere to be found here. While the indicators and 
targets broadly reflect the type of development thinking that under-
writes the CPIA, the CPIA as such does not play any significant role 
in the work of the CABS group or in the policy dialogue with the gov-
ernment. The Malawi MDGS, which provides the overarching frame-
work for the dialogue between donors (including the Bank) and the 
government, makes no reference to the CPIA or the PBA.  
 
Interviews with civil society organizations in Malawi yield a similar 
picture. The Malawi Economic Justice Network, by most accounts the 
largest and most central CSO focused on economic growth and pov-
erty, had never heard about the CPIA – again indicating that the CPIA 
may be central to discussions between Bank officials and a small 
group of officials within the Ministry of Finance, but it is not central 
to the policy dialogue as such. Bank officials also acknowledged this, 
noting that ‘Ideally, government should use the CPIA but they don’t. 
Debt and Aid in Ministry of Finance has tried to improve and use the 
CPIA and also the PAF rigorously in internal negotiations.’61 This 
view was also communicated by officials in the Ministry of Finance, 
with one informant noting that ‘We (Debt and Aid in the Ministry of 
Finance) have tried to sell CPIA to other parts of the government that 
it matters, but with limited effect. The Debt and Aid section has to 
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make clear why PFEM Action Plan is important because of its links to 
CPIA and thus also PBA.’62 
 
CPIA and the CAS 
When compared with the CPIA for Malawi, the CAS does not seem to 
give priority to those areas identified by the CPIA as showing the poo-
rest performance. Bank support, as stipulated in the CAS, is 29% for 
human development, 34% for infrastructure, 24% for agriculture, rural 
development and natural resources, 7% for private sector development 
and 6% for public sector development.63 This prioritization in the 
CAS seems to dovetail with the MDGS – as it is supposed to, accor-
ding to Bank mode of operations. But it does not harmonize with the 
CPIA ratings. The CPIA ratings (see above) have remained fairly 
constant on all indicators for the period 2005 – 2008, whereas IDA 
allocations have not. According to the 2007 CAS for Malawi, the es-
timate is that Malawi will have access to USD 80 million in the fiscal 
year 2007/08, and USD 95 million in the fiscal year 2009/10, subject 
to PBA ratings and the size of IDA 15. However, this is the only refe-
rence to the PBA and CPIA; and the latter can hardly be said to ‘an-
chor’ or shape in any significant way the CAS at the country level, as 
evidenced by the fact that funding priorities within the CAS are alig-
ned with the MDGS, not the CPIA.  
 
There is structural tension here in how the Bank describes the ideal 
uses of the CPIA in relation to the CAS. On the one hand, the CAS is 
meant to respond to the country’s own PRSP as a reflection of country 
ownership. On the other hand, the CPIA is to anchor the CAS and 
identify areas in need of special attention. In the case of Malawi, the 
CAS seems to be aligned with the MDGS (Malawi’s PRSP), and not 
with the CPIA. There are good reasons why the CAS should be alig-
ned with the PRSP rather than the CPIA – but this fact also suggests 
that the CPIA occupies an uneasy position towards the CAS, as it is an 
external assessment of policy and institutional performance against a 
given standard, not a reflection of the government’s (ownership) and 
policy priorities, as reflected in their PRSP.  
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4. Conclusions 
Our findings indicate that, while the CPIA, through the PBA, clearly 
does affect IDA allocations, there is – at least in the two cases re-
viewed here – no clear relationship between CPIA ratings and IDA 
allocations. Moreover, the CPIA does not seem to anchor or serve as a 
tool for prioritizing the CAS. Rather, the CAS responds, as it is indeed 
meant to do, to the government’s own plans, and these appear to take 
priority over CPIA. For example, the CPIA and PBA are referred to in 
the CAS for Malawi only to show the general level of IDA allocation, 
not to indicate priorities as to where the Bank should direct its re-
sources. Third, we find that the CPIA does not play any significant 
role in the policy dialogue at the country level. The case of Ethiopia 
shows that the CPIA is contested by the government and as such it 
does form part of the policy dialogue – but it does not guide, shape or 
contribute to the alignment of priorities and policies on the part of the 
government. In the case of Malawi, where the relationship between 
the Bank and the government is of a different character and where 
budget support is being provided, the CPIA does not occupy a central 
position in the policy dialogue, except for those persons in the Minis-
try of Finance responsible for coordinating with the Bank on aid mat-
ters. Instead, other indicators and targets are used by the CABS group 
in their on-going dialogue with the government. 
 
Thus we find that the CPIA does not play a significant role at the 
country level in terms of signalling incentives, shaping policy dia-
logue, or informing the CAS. That is not to suggest, however, that the 
CPIA might not play such a role in other countries, or that it cannot be 
made more powerful in shaping both incentives, in structuring policy 
dialogue and in prioritizing the CAS. What we do mean to say is that 
several important questions remain to be dealt with in the debate about 
the CPIA and the PBA  
 
5. Recommendations 
1. In order to be made into a diagnostic tool for shaping policies and 
institutions in partner countries, the process of producing the CPIA 
must be made more transparent, and the resultant CPIA ratings publi-
cized and actively promoted by the Bank – not only towards the gov-
ernment, but also to the general public. The CPIA started out as an 
internal, largely secret, undertaking by the Bank. For various reasons, 
the Bank still seems to produce and use the CPIA in the same way, 
even though CPIA ratings are now disclosed. One official indicated 
that the CPIA can be a very useful tool to be used by governments to-
wards other donors to attract funding, saying ‘If CPIA gives bad score 
on an issue, government can take this to donors and ask for support. 
For example, a poor score on girls’ education, which can be linked to 
the MDGs, too.’  
 
2. If the CPIA and the PBA are to signal incentives forcefully, IDA 
allocations would have to be made publicly available for all to see that 
a government’s actions and policies actually result in either higher or 
lower allocations. Moreover, a link could easily be made between 
CPIA ratings and partner-country policies and priorities by including 
in the CPIA write-ups specific actions that would have to be taken by 
partner countries to improve the score over time. One could also make 
a modified version of the CPIA write-ups, including suggested actions 
deemed important by the Bank, available to the general public so as to 
generate debate and accountability between partner-country govern-
ments and their citizens. 
 
3. The role of the CPIA in shaping and informing the CAS brings up a 
structural tension between the CPIA as an external assessment of 
‘good’ policies and institutions, on the one hand, and the govern-
ment’s own PRSP, on the other. A review of the relative importance 
of the CPIA and the PRSP in shaping the CAS could be established as 
a means to assess the extent to which the CAS reflects universal stan-
dards (CPIA) or the government’s own priorities (PRSP). This seems 
important not only as a means to help make the Bank’s operations 
more context specific, but also to assess how the Bank understands 
and implements the principle of national ownership that underwrites 
the PRSP. 
 
4. The debate about performance vs need, and about the transparency 
and secrecy of CPIA ratings and write ups, cannot and should not be 
concluded before a far more thorough assessment has been made to 
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determine how well the CPIA captures the determinants of growth, 
poverty reduction and aid effectiveness in various countries. If the 
CPIA and the PBA in fact do capture the key determinants for growth, 
poverty reduction and the effective use of aid , then there are good 
reasons for expanding the role of the CPIA as an overarching knowl-
edge product in the public domain and possibly also expanding the 
incentive structure offered by the CPIA-PBA mechanism. If not, then 
there is a strong case to be made for scaling down the CPIA to its 
original format of assessing fiduciary risks, however defined, in allo-
cating funds among countries, and for allocating funds on the basis of 
needs and allowing partner countries, with Bank support, to tailor their 
policies to national and regional contexts.  
 
5. Donors, the Bank, and partner countries may want to consider that 
there is a structural tension between two roles that the CPIA and PBA 
are currently serving. The PBA is a rules-based system of allocation 
funds, and all international organizations typically adopt such systems 
to allocate funds among countries in an equitable manner. This ‘allo-
cation function’ of the CPIA-PBA is at loggerheads with the more 
forward-looking ‘policy function’ gradually accorded to the CPIA-
PBA in terms of setting a comprehensive standard for good develop-
ment policy and providing incentives for partner countries to conform. 
To ensure equitable treatment in allocating funds, the CPIA-PBA must 
maintain a universal standard (whether based on needs or perform-
ance, or a combination). To be effective in capturing the determinants 
of growth in a particular country and to tailor policy advice accord-
ingly, however, requires going away from the ‘one size fits all’ logic 
embedded in the CPIA-PBA. Hence, there are good reasons for trying 
to separate or de-couple the debate about the contents of the CPIA and 
PBA as an allocation mechanism from the debate about how the Bank 
should advise on policy and seek to help particular countries achieve 
growth, poverty reduction and effective uses of aid based on their in-
dividual circumstances. 
 
 
